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Dialogue: Clarified and Reconsidered
RAINER KNOPFF*, RHONDA EVANS†, DENNIS BAKER‡, &
DAVE SNOW§
Controversies about constitutional “dialogue” often stem from disagreement over the
concept itself. The metaphor’s meaning and attendant consequences differ depending
on whether it reflects the assumptions of judicial interpretive supremacy or coordinate
interpretation. By combining that distinction with the contrast between weak-form and
strong-form rights review, this article creates an integrated framework for clarifying dialogic
variation across such jurisdictions as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia. We apply this framework most intensely to the Canadian case
and bring differences between several dialogic forms—especially the difference between
“clarification dialogue” and “reconsideration dialogue”—into sharper relief than is common
in the literature. The classification of dialogic types revealed by the Canadian experience can,
we suggest, illuminate analysis in other jurisdictions.
Les controverses soulevées par le « dialogue » constitutionnel émanent souvent d’un
désaccord sur le concept qu’il recouvre. La métaphore présente une signification et des
conséquences qui diffèrent selon qu’elle s’appuie sur les hypothèses de la primauté de
l’interprétation judiciaire ou celles de l’interprétation coordonnée. En tenant compte de cette
distinction, et en opposant la forme faible et la forme forte de l’examen de la situation des
droits, le présent article pose un cadre intégré visant à préciser les variations dialogiques
entre différents pays comme les États-Unis, le Canada, le Royaume-Uni, la Nouvelle-Zélande
et l’Australie. Nous appliquons ce cadre plus particulièrement au cas canadien et faisons
ressortir les différences entre plusieurs formes dialogiques – notamment la différence entre
le « dialogue de clarification » et le « dialogue de réexamen » – avec plus d’acuité que c’est
habituellement le cas dans ce type d’études. Nous suggérons ainsi que la classification des
types dialogiques qui ressort de l’exemple canadien peut éclairer l’analyse dans d’autres pays.
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THE IDEA OF “DIALOGUE” between the judiciary and the more obviously political

branches of government has generated much discussion and controversy around
the liberal democratic world. The dialogue metaphor has a long history in the
United States and was for a time something of an obsession in Canada. Canadian
proponents of the metaphor see it as a democratic defence of judicial power,1
while critics maintain that so-called dialogue is often little more than legislative
obedience to judicial command.2 Discussion of the metaphor has been broadened
and further energized by the adoption of statutory bills of rights in New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and at the state and territory level in Australia. These new
‘Commonwealth’ initiatives explicitly seek better inter-institutional dialogue
than their designers discern in the American and Canadian models.
The controversies about dialogue involve different understandings of the
concept. These differences make the term somewhat imprecise and subject to
“shifting and sometimes contradictory definitions.”3 Nevertheless, the metaphor
remains entrenched in the literature, perhaps because of its attractive implication
that constitutional law is best understood as the product of inter-institutional
interactions. Indeed, the attractiveness of the metaphor might be related to its
ability to encompass radically different understandings of the judicial role in a
constitutional democracy. In particular, the dialogue metaphor differs in meaning
and consequence depending on whether it reflects the assumptions of judicial

1.

2.
3.

See Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All” (1997) 35:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue? (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) [Roach, Supreme Court on Trial].
See F L Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” (1999) April Pol’y Options 23; Christopher
Manfredi & James Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell” (1999)
37 Osgoode Hall LJ 513.
Emmett Macfarlane, “Conceptual Precision and Parliamentary Systems of Rights:
Disambiguating ‘Dialogue’” (2012) 17:2 Rev Const Stud 73 at 97.
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interpretive supremacy (in which case we will call it “court-centric dialogue”4)
or the perspective of “coordinate interpretation” (“coordinate dialogue”). As its
name suggests, coordinate dialogue envisages a legitimate interpretive role for the
non-judicial branches of government.5
Whether court-centric or coordinate dialogue prevails is in turn affected,
though not determined, by whether the relevant regime exhibits “strong-form”
or “weak-form” judicial review.6 Coordinate dialogue is fostered by weak-form
systems but can occur in the less hospitable environment of strong-form systems.
Similarly, the assumptions of judicial interpretive supremacy may become
powerful enough in apparently weak-form systems to cause an evolution—or
“escalation”7—in the direction of judicial supremacy and court-centric dialogue.
This article explores the clash between court-centric and coordinate
perspectives on dialogue under weak-form and strong-form rights documents.
Through a comparison of the United States and four Commonwealth regimes
(Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia), Part I fleshes out
our interrelated analytical distinctions: strong-form versus weak-form review,
and court-centric versus coordinate dialogue. These are not new distinctions, but
combining them into an explicitly integrated framework enables the clarification
and reconsideration promised by the article’s title. When the rest of the article
then applies this framework to the Canadian case, variation among kinds of
dialogue comes into sharper relief than is common in the literature. Especially
important is the difference between “clarification dialogue” and “reconsideration
dialogue” that gives our title its second meaning. The classification of dialogic
types revealed by the Canadian experience can, we suggest, illuminate analysis in
other jurisdictions.

4.
5.

6.

7.

A term we adapt from Janet Hiebert’s description of “judicial-centric” review. See Janet L
Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?” (2006) 69:1 Mod L Rev 7.
While we accept Aileen Kavanagh’s claim that some aspects of the dialogue metaphor may
encourage “distortions,” we reject her characterization of those favouring a robust, coordinate
version of dialogue as “Charter haters.” See Aileen Kavanagh, “The lure and limits of
dialogue” (2016) 66:1 UTLJ 83 at 111-20.
Mark Tushnet, “Alternative Forms of Judicial Review” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 2781
[Tushnet, “Alternative Forms”]; “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Perspective of
Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 813-14 [Tushnet,
“New Forms of Judicial Review”]; “Dialogic Judicial Review” (2009) 61 Ark L Rev 205
[Tushnet, “Dialogic Judicial Review”].
Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” supra note 6 at 824.
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I. COURT-CENTRIC VERSUS COORDINATE DIALOGUE
UNDER STRONG-FORM AND WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL
REVIEW
We begin with Mark Tushnet’s distinction between strong-form and weak-form
systems of judicial review, which differentiates how lawmaking majorities can
displace judicial interpretations. In strong-form systems, judicial interpretations
can be displaced only through protracted or extraordinary political processes.8
Most obviously, the constitutional text can be amended, but amendment usually
entails a super-majoritarian process, which is politically difficult to complete.
Alternatively, the electoral ascendancy of a new political coalition can over time
appoint a bench that subscribes to a different constitutional vision;9 or a successful
social movement may persuade judges to change their views.10 Finally, a court may
expediently depart from its constitutional convictions in order to mollify political
opposition that threatens retaliatory action.11 Weak-form judicial review systems,
by contrast, provide mechanisms through which ordinary legislative majorities
can displace judicial decisions and act according to contrary constitutional
understandings.12 Accordingly, while both strong-form and weak-form systems
allow the other branches of government to challenge and change judicial
interpretations, they do so over different time frames. “Strong-form systems,”
writes Tushnet, “allow the political branches to revise judicial interpretations in
the longish run [through extraordinary processes], weak-form ones in the short
run [via ordinary legislative majorities].”13
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the varieties of strong-form
and weak-form judicial review and arrays several common-law regimes across the
weak- versus strong-form continuum. The classic instance of strong-form review
exists in the United States (depicted at the right of Figure 1), where judicial
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008)
at 34-35 [Tushnet, Weak Courts].
See Robert A Dahl, “The Concept of Power” (1957) 2:3 Behav Sci 201; Barry Friedman,
“Dialogue and Judicial Review” (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 577; Barry Friedman, “The Politics of
Judicial Review” (2005) 84:2 Texas L Rev 257.
See Robert C Post, “Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law” (2003)
117 Harv L Rev 4; Reva B Siegel, “Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a
Social Movement Perspective” (2001) 150 U Pa L Rev 297.
Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol 1: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1991).
Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note 8 at 22-23.
Ibid at 34.
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interpretation of the national constitution, including the Bill of Rights,14 can
generally be revised by the other branches only “in the longish run.”15
Canada, for reasons we shall explore below, has some of the formal features
of weak-form review with respect to rights review under its Charter of Rights and
Freedoms16 but generally behaves like a strong-form system; hence it is portrayed
as bridging the two categories. New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
Australian sub-national jurisdictions of Victoria and the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) have statutory bills of rights that allow weak-form judicial
review, which can more readily be revised by ordinary legislative majorities in
the short run. The rest of Australia has no explicit rights documents and thus
occupies the weak-form pole of the continuum in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: STRONG- AND WEAK-FORM REVIEW
Weak-form Judicial Review

Strong-form Judicial Review

Judicial interpretation displaceable by ordinary legislative
majorities in short term

Judicial interpretation withstands
ordinary legislative majorities

Australia
federal

New Zealand

United
Kingdom

Canada

United States

Invalidation mandate

ACT, Victoria

Incompatibility mandate
Interpretive mandate

Figure 1 helps us flesh out the differences (and commonalities) between and
among weak-form and strong-form systems. The lower part of the Figure depicts
14. US Const amend I-X.
15. Note, however, that the constitutions of US states are all much easier to amend, often
through legislatively referred or popularly initiated referendums. That is, state constitutions
are arguably weak form in the sense of being revisable in the relative short run by
majoritarian processes. Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note 8 at 34.
16. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter].

614

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

three categories of judicial mandate. The foundational interpretive mandate is
enjoyed by all courts in common-law liberal democracies and spans the continuum
of weak- and strong-form systems. We include in this category the traditional
judicial powers both to revise judge-made common law and to choose between
plausibly available interpretations of statutes. Although statutory interpretation
gets most of the attention in discussions of inter-institutional dialogue about
rights, common-law development, as we shall see, is also important.
The interpretive mandate exists with respect to rights issues whether or
not there is a bill of rights. Judges employed this mandate to protect rights well
before explicit bills of rights existed. As Claudia Geiringer observes with respect
to statutory interpretation, “[w]here fundamental values are perceived to be
threatened, the common law courts have long utilized the traditional common
law presumptions to promote literal or even strained meanings in disregard of
statutory purpose.”17 Courts have also modified judge-made common law to
better reflect rights. This was a central mode of judicial rights protection in
countries like Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom before their
relatively recent adoption of statutory or constitutional rights documents.
Jurisdictions without explicit bills of rights—including most of Australia
today and other Commonwealth regimes in the past—are often excluded from
discussions of rights-based judicial review; instead, they are associated with
“parliamentary supremacy.”18 At least from the perspective of dialogue between
the courts and other branches of government, we consider this an unhelpful
exclusion. Inter-institutional dialogue, based on interpretive choices by judges,
is independent of the existence of formal rights documents,19 and judicial
interpretations can have considerable staying power without being grounded
in such documents.20 Even where courts clearly have much stronger mandates,
as they do in Canada and the United States, they share the basic interpretive

17. Claudia Geiringer, “The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical
Examination of R v Hansen” (2008) 6:1 NZJPIL 59 at 63.
18. Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” supra note 6 at 830.
19. For example, although Australia lacks a bill of rights, its High Court has nevertheless
employed in its approach to statutory interpretation a presumption against the violation of
fundamental rights by the legislature. See Potter v Minaham (1908), 7 CLR 277, 14 ALR
635 (HCA); Coco v The Queen (1994), 179 CLR 427, 20 ALR 415 (HCA).
20. Thomas Flanagan “The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo: Collective Choice
in Canada’s Parliament after Morgentaler” (1997) 30:1 Can J of Poli Sci 31 at 53; Roach,
Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 65-68, 254-63; Tushnet “New Forms of Judicial
Review,” supra note 6 at 833-34.
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mandate of developing the common law and giving ambiguous statutes a
rights-compatible interpretation when possible and appropriate.21
Some of the jurisdictions in Figure 1 have adopted bills of rights that expressly
formalize and promote the kind of interpretive mandate that had previously been
implicit. In other words, these documents serve as a compendium of norms to
guide the traditional interpretive mandate. For example, section 6 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) provides that “[w]herever an enactment
can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms obtained
in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.”22
Similarly, section 3 of the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 provides
that primary and subordinate legislation must “be read and given effect in a way
which is compatible with [protected] rights” whenever “it is possible to do so.”23
In Australia, the ACT and Victorian bills of rights use the same approach.24 In
Canada, the Supreme Court will, in circumstances of “genuine ambiguity”—
that is, where the relevant statute “is subject to differing, but equally plausible,
interpretations”—read the statute in a Charter-compliant manner.25
But just when is a rights-compatible interpretation possible and appropriate?
Recall Geiringer’s statement that judges can use the interpretive mandate to
promote “even strained meanings in disregard of statutory purpose.”26 Such
strained interpretations arouse controversy across the weak- versus strong-form
continuum. In the weak-form UK system, the case R v A27 generated such
controversy. In that case, say Janet Hiebert and James Kelly, “the Law Lords altered
parliament’s clear intention about how the rules of evidence are interpreted in the
context of sexual assault trials”28—that is, the Lords essentially rewrote the law,
something that can be described as “interpretation” only if one adds the adjective
“strained.” In relatively strong-form Canada, the famous 1992 censorship case R
v Butler raises similar issues. In Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
Criminal Code’s prohibition of “obscenity,”29 but only after interpretively finding
21. R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452, 89 DLR (4th) 449 [Butler]; Bell ExpressVu Limited
Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559 [Bell ExpressVu].
22. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, NZ No 109, s 6 [BORA].
23. 1998 (UK), c 42, s 3(1) [UK Human Rights Act].
24. Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) [ACT Human Rights Act]; Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) [Victoria Charter of Human Rights].
25. Bell ExpressVu, supra note 21 at para 62.
26. Geiringer, supra note 17 at 63.
27. R v A, [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45 [R v A].
28. Janet L Hiebert & James B Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New Zealand
and the United Kingdom (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 267-68.
29. Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 163(8).
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that a law clearly written to prohibit most explicit erotica on moralistic grounds
criminalized just pornography involving harm to women and children. For Kent
Roach, this judicial rewriting of the law exemplifies the judiciary’s attempt “under
the Charter to fix laws through creative and strained interpretations.”30 In Roach’s
view, this “spurious technique of statutory interpretation” involves the “fiction
that the court is not departing from the words and intent of the legislature.”31
Because it is a fiction, moreover, this claim fails “the test of judicial candour.”32
What happens when judges, resisting strained interpretation, find it
impossible to give a law a rights-compatible interpretation? In those circumstances,
most bills of rights give judges the incompatibility mandate depicted in Figure 1.
In many weak-form systems this incompatibility mandate goes no further than
what Tushnet calls an “augmented interpretive mandate.”33 Thus, when UK
courts cannot come to a compatible interpretation, they have the augmented
authority to issue explicit statements of incompatibility.34 The same is true in
the ACT.35 The terminology differs slightly in the Australian State of Victoria
where courts may issue statements of “inconsistent interpretation.”36 Such
incompatibility statements merely augment the interpretive mandate because
they leave the law in place and fully applicable, meaning that the ruling does not
affect the parties’ legal rights. Incompatible laws are not judicially invalidated
under these weak-form bills of rights.
The New Zealand BORA appears on its face to establish only the basic,
un-augmented interpretive mandate. Section 4 obligates judges to give effect to
legislation that they have concluded is incapable of being interpreted consistently
with the BORA, but the document does not explicitly provide for the kind of
incompatibility statements found in other weak-form bills.37 Nevertheless, the
incompatibility mandate may be implied. After all, when judges explicitly recognize
inconsistency in the course of applying the law, have they not implicitly declared
inconsistency? In a series of decisions, New Zealand judges have acknowledged

30. “Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (2005) 55:3
UTLJ 733 at 735.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note 8 at 27.
34. UK Human Rights Act, supra note 23, s 4.
35. ACT Human Rights Act, supra note 24, s 32.
36. Victoria Charter of Human Rights, supra note 24, s 36.
37. BORA, supra note 22, s 4.
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this implication.38 In 2000, the New Zealand Court of Appeal even asserted the
power to make an explicit declaration that legislation is inconsistent with the
BORA despite the absence of a formal provision to that effect in the BORA.39
Subsequent decisions, however, have mostly avoided explicit declarations of
inconsistency.40 As a separate but related development, in 2001 the New Zealand
Parliament amended the Human Rights Act 1993 to empower the Human Rights
Review Tribunal to declare legislation to be inconsistent with section 19 of the
BORA, which prohibits discrimination on various specified grounds.41 Because
New Zealand’s situation remains ambiguous in this respect, however, it straddles
the “interpretive mandate” and “incompatibility mandate” categories in Figure 1.
The incompatibility mandate remains weak-form review in jurisdictions
like the United Kingdom, where ordinary legislative majorities can choose
to leave the pre-existing legal status quo intact despite a judicial declaration
of incompatibility.42 This raises the question of why judges would choose

38. Quilter v Attorney-General, [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA); R v Hansen, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (CA);
Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, [2007] NZSC 54.
39. Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review, [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 19 (CA) [Moonen].
40. Moonen did not itself make an explicit declaration of inconsistency. Supra note 39. The
first such declaration did not occur until 2015. See Taylor v Attorney-General, [2015]
NZHC 1706 [Taylor]. At the time of writing the New Zealand Supreme Court has not
pronounced on the legitimacy of the approach in Taylor. See also The Hon Justice Matthew
Palmer, “Constitutional Dialogue and the Rule of Law” (Key Note Address delivered at the
Constitutional Dialogue Conference, Faculty of Law, Hong Kong University, 9 December
2016) <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/CDRL.pdf>.
41. Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ), 1993/82, Part 1A [NZ Human Rights Act]. The Human
Rights Review Tribunal serves as the first forum for the adjudication of complaints that are
initiated under the Human Rights Act.
42. The UK situation is complicated by the fact that courts in Scotland and Northern Ireland
have the power to invalidate incompatible statutes enacted by the devolved legislative
assemblies in these two jurisdictions. With respect to such legislation, these courts enjoy
the strong-form “invalidation mandate” discussed below. As Stephen Gardbaum puts it,
“The [UK Human Rights Act] sets up a separate system of strong-form judicial review of
legislative acts of these two devolved assemblies alongside the weak-form review of acts
of the UK Parliament at Westminster.” Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth
Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2013) at 158.
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a declaration of incompatibility over a strained interpretation.43 Finding
inconsistency seems more dramatic, but it leaves the inconsistent law in place.
By contrast, interpretive fixing seems less dramatic but can in practice be difficult
for unhappy legislators to change. To the extent that Thomas Flanagan is right
about the “staying power” of a policy status quo,44 interpretive fixing may turn
out to be more activist than finding or declaring inconsistency. For example,
with respect to the aforementioned strained interpretation in R v A,45 the UK
Parliament could have changed the new, judicially created policy status quo and
restored the original intention, but it did not—as Flanagan, among others, might
have predicted.
To be sure, the strategic considerations affecting the choice between strained
interpretation and declaring incompatibility in weak-form systems is affected
by the extent to which declarations of incompatibility are politically potent
rather than impotent. Under some conditions, a declaration of incompatibility
may be effectively exploited to pressure the legislature to amend the impugned
law; it may even make the amendment easier than it otherwise would be. The
UK Human Rights Act facilitates easy amendment by expressly providing for
a fast-track procedure that the relevant government minister may employ to
amend impugned legislation. In instances where the minister deems the need
for an amendment to be urgent the law may even be amended by ministerial
order, subject to Parliament’s subsequent ratification.46 Such amendments
might sometimes be undertaken reluctantly, but they may also occur when
the legislature prefers the judicial approach—perhaps because the inconsistent
legislation is clearly out of step with contemporary norms, or because it has an
effect the legislature did not anticipate.
In strong-form systems, a finding of incompatibility goes well beyond an
augmented interpretive mandate; it often entails the more dramatic invalidation
mandate displayed in Figure 1. When American and Canadian judges choose to
43. Though we do not engage this question here, we note that the discipline of Political Science
offers various theories that seek to explain judicial behavior in such circumstances. According
to a strategic account of judicial decision-making, judges would consider the preferences of
other actors (i.e., the legislature, executive, and civil society actors as well as public opinion)
in choosing their course of action, whereas an attitudinal approach would expect judges to
act according to their sincerely held ideological preferences. For a strategic account, see Lee
Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998); for
an attitudinal approach, see Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
44. Flanagan, supra note 20.
45. R v A, supra note 27.
46. UK Human Rights Act, supra note 23, s 10.
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find incompatibility instead of interpretively fixing an impugned law, they do not
risk leaving in place what they consider to be a rights violation. To the contrary:
they strike the law down.
Invalidation mandates, of course, exist not only with respect to constitutionally
entrenched rights documents but also with respect to other, structural features
of entrenched constitutions. Federalism review, for example, exists in the United
States, Canada, and Australia. Such structural review can sometimes raise the
kinds of “matters of moral or political significance” that characterize explicit
rights jurisprudence,47 particularly when constitutions lack many entrenched
rights. In other words, regimes that are formally weak-form with respect to rights
can sometimes use structural review to achieve strong-form rights protection.
In both Australia and pre-Charter Canada, federalism review sometimes provided
an indirect way of invalidating rights violations.48 In both countries, moreover,
judges have argued that the constitutionally prescribed parliamentary form of
government implies freedom of expression and have sometimes—though not
often—used that right to invalidate legislation.49 Although such indirect routes
to the judicial invalidation of rights violations are important and interesting, they
lie beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on explicit rights documents.

47. Adrienne Stone, “Judicial Review without Rights” (2008) 28 Oxford J Leg Stud 1;
“Democratic Objections to Structural Judicial Review and the Judicial Role in Constitutional
Law” (2010) 60 UTLJ 109 at 134.
48. For example, in 1951 the High Court of Australia struck down legislation that banned
the Communist Party and placed restrictions on persons declared to be communists or
members of the Party, but it did so on grounds that the Commonwealth lacked the legislative
authority to enact such a law under the Federal Constitution—not because the law breached
constitutionally protected civil liberties; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth,
[1951] HCA 5, 83 CLR 1. Similarly, in 1957, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on
federalism to strike down a Quebec law enabling police to shut down premises used to
propagate communism; Switzman v Elbling and AG Quebec, [1957] SCR 285, 1957 CanLII
2 (SCC). Because such use of federalism to protect civil liberties resulted in the civil liberty
at stake remaining under the threat of direct infringement by another level of government,
it cannot be simply described as an aspect of strong-form rights protection.
49. In Canada, implied rights were never used by more than a minority of Supreme Court
justices to support any constitutional invalidation; see Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938]
SCR 100, 1938 CanLII 1 (SCC). In Australia, High Court majorities have occasionally used
implied rights as the main ground of invalidation. See e.g. Australian Capital Television Pty
Ltd v Commonwealth, [1992] HCA 1, 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times
Ltd, [1994] HCA 46, 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australian Newspaper Ltd, [1994] HCA
45, 182 CLR 211. Such jurisprudence was controversial, however, and subsequent decisions
rejected implied rights: Langer v Commonwealth, [1996] HCA 43, 186 CLR 302; McGinty v
State of Western Australia, (1996), 186 CLR 140.
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The judicial conclusion that a law must be invalidated under an entrenched
rights document may involve more than just the infringement of protected
rights or freedoms. In Canada, for example, section 1 of the Charter subjects the
document’s protected rights and freedoms “to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”50 Thus,
only unreasonable and unjustified infringements are sufficiently incompatible
with the Charter to require invalidation. Canadian judges will seek legal
interpretations—sometimes including strained interpretations—to bring laws
within the reasonable limits standard. This is what Canada’s Supreme Court
achieved in Butler51 by rewriting the censorship law to embrace a much narrower
range of materials. Had the law continued to prohibit most erotica on moral
grounds, it could not be justified as a reasonable limit on freedom of expression.
Having been given a narrower, harm-based reading to protect women and
children, however, the law became justified as a reasonable limit. In many other
cases, however, Canadian judges invalidate what they consider unreasonable
limits on rights.
New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act copied Canada’s “reasonable limits”
provision. As in Canada, the New Zealand provision can save laws from ultimate
inconsistency or incompatibility with the rights document. On the other hand,
a finding of “unreasonable limits” in weak-form New Zealand leaves the law in
place, while the same finding in strong-form Canada leads to invalidation.
But just how strong-form is the Canadian system? Invalidation can have
different consequences depending on whether or not it can be reversed by
ordinary legislative majorities. While such reversal is not possible under the US
Constitution, it is in Canada where section 33 of the Charter allows legislatures
to immunize legislation against challenge for renewable five-year periods by
including in the act a clause stating that it shall operate “notwithstanding” certain
Charter rights and freedoms.52 Under the US Constitution, by contrast, a judicial
50. Charter, supra note 16, s 1.
51. Butler, supra note 21.
52. Charter, supra note 16, s 33. This paper is concerned with section 33 only as a legislative way
of disagreeing with and reversing a judicial decision, what Tsvi Kahana calls the “remedial”
use of the notwithstanding mechanism. The clause can also be used in a “pre-emptive sense”
to immunize legislation from judicial review altogetheri.e., to prevent inter-institutional
dialogue from the outset. Early in the Charter’s history, Quebec used section 33 in this
fashion to protect its entire statute book (An Act respecting the Constitution Act, 1982,
SQ 1982, c 21, ss 1, 7). Demonstrating that most uses of s 33 fall into the pre-emptive
category, Kahana thinks it should be invoked only to remedy judicial decisionsnot just
any judicial decisions, moreover, but only those “of the highest court possible,” usually the
Supreme Court. Tsvi Kahana, “The notwithstanding mechanism and public discussion:

Knopff, Evans†, Baker, Snow, Dialogue: Clarified and Reconsidered 621

invalidation of legislation can generally be overcome only by constitutional
amendment or “packing” the court to promote a judicial change of mind. The
latter are long-term strategies, whereas section 33 allows “ordinary legislative
majorities [to] displace judicial interpretation of the constitution in the
relatively short run.”53
Short run displacement of judicial interpretation by ordinary legislative
majorities is central to what Tushnet calls weak-form judicial review. If this
feature exists in Canada by virtue of section 33, it is obviously present in regimes
with only the interpretive mandate where legislatures can simply reverse a judicial
interpretation by enacting new and clearer contrary legislation. It is also present
where legislatures can effectively ignore a finding of inconsistency (New Zealand)
or an explicit declaration of incompatibility (the UK). This is why all of these
regimes fall into the category of weak-form review in Figure 1 while the United
States at the federal level most clearly represents strong-form review, which has
greater power to withstand disagreement by ordinary legislative majorities.
As previously noted, the weak-form zone in Figure 1 extends only part way
into Canada, which also occupies some of the strong-form zone. This is so for two
reasons. First, section 33 can be used to immunize legislation only against sections
2 and 7-15 of the Charter. Other sections—e.g., section 3 “democratic rights,”54
including the right to vote—are subject to strong-form judicial review. Thus, the
narrowly (and passionately) divided five-four decision in Sauvé v Canada,55 ruling
all forms of prisoner voting disqualification unconstitutional, can be displaced
only by constitutional amendment or a future change of the collective judicial
mind. Second, for reasons we will explore further below, section 33 has become
so politically difficult to use that most observers, including us, now treat Canada
as a regime of judicial review that works mostly in strong-form ways. We say
mostly strong-form because of the occasional instances in which legislatures reject
a Charter-based judicial decision without using the notwithstanding clause. Such
legislation rejects judicial interpretive supremacy and is now the chief vehicle for
coordinate interpretation in the Canadian system.
This brings us to our second distinction, court-centric versus coordinate
dialogue, which interacts in important ways with the weak-form versus

Lessons from the ignored practice of section 33 of the Charter” (2001) 44:3 Can Pub Admin
255 at 276; see also “Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism” (2002) 52 UTLJ 221.
53. Tushnet, “Alternative Forms,” supra note 6 at 2786.
54. Charter, supra note 16, s 3.
55. Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 [Sauvé II].
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strong-form distinction. Figure 2 adds a layer to Figure 1 to facilitate discussion
of the differences and connections between the two distinctions.
FIGURE 2: COURT-CENTRIC VERSUS COORDINATE DIALOGUE
Judicial interpretive supremacy/Court-centric dialogue
Coordinate interpretation/Coordinate dialogue
Weak-form Judicial Review

Strong-form Judicial Review

Judicial interpretation displaceable by ordinary legislative
majorities in short term

Judicial interpretation withstands
ordinary legislative majorities

Australia
federal

New Zealand

United
Kingdom

Canada

United States

Invalidation mandate

ACT, Victoria

Incompatibility mandate
Interpretive mandate

Beginning with the assumption that most issues of constitutional
interpretation are open to reasonable disagreement, coordinate interpretation
maintains that legislatures and executives can contribute their own ‘reasonable’
views to the interpretive process. Judicial interpretations, in this view, should
certainly settle the dispute between the immediate parties to a case but not
necessarily the broader policy questions at stake.56 Under this “case and
controversy” constraint, legislatures can legitimately disagree with high-court
constitutional interpretations and test judicial commitment by acting on their

56. Dennis Baker, Not Quite Supreme: The Supreme Court of Canada and Coordinate
Constitutional Interpretation (Montreal, Que/Kingston, Ont: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2010) at 92-96 [Baker, Not Quite Supreme].
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contrary constitutional understandings.57 This is coordinate dialogue. Tushnet
takes this coordinate view when he explains dialogue as “interactions … among
the branches about which of the competing reasonable interpretations of
constitutional provisions is correct.”58 Similarly, Christopher Manfredi and James
Kelly assert that “[g]enuine dialogue only exists when legislatures are recognized
as legitimate interpreters of the constitution and have an effective means to assert
that interpretation.”59
By contrast, the chief founders of dialogue theory in Canada, Peter Hogg
and Allison Thornton, have (together with Wade Wright) called into question the
legitimacy of coordinate dialogue in the Canadian context: “If ‘genuine’ dialogue
can only occur where legislatures share coordinate authority with the courts to
interpret the constitution,” they wrote in 2007, “then by definition it cannot
exist in Canada, where legislatures have no such authority.”60 This perspective
envisions court-centric dialogue in which legislative response is permitted only
within the bounds of judicially established interpretations and does not extend
to challenging the judicial interpretations themselves.61 In this view, the rules
offered by the majority (or plurality) of a court are non-negotiable and open to
only as much flexibility as the controlling judgment itself allows. Coordinate
theorists respond that such dialogue is really “a monologue, with judges doing
most of the talking and legislatures most of the listening.”62
The diagonal line separating the two interpretive theories (and their associated
forms of dialogue) in Figure 2 indicates how they are affected by the strong-form/
weak-form distinction. On the one hand, allowing ordinary legislative majorities
to displace judicial interpretations suggests equal (or coordinate) interpretive
authority for courts and legislatures and thus makes weak-form systems
particularly hospitable to coordinate dialogue. Indeed, the weak-form systems
57. Dennis Baker & Rainer Knopff, “Minority Retort: A Parliamentary Power to Resolve Judicial
Disagreement in Close Cases” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 347 [Baker & Knopff,
“Minority Retort”].
58. Tushnet, “Dialogic Judicial Review,” supra note 6 at 209.
59. Manfredi & Kelly, supra note 2 at 523-24.
60. Peter W Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Dialogue Revisited − Or
‘Much Ado about Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 31 [emphasis added].
61. Later in the same article, Hogg, Thornton & Wright hedge this outright rejection of
coordinate interpretation somewhat to allow “the legislative and executive branches [to]
act on a conflicting interpretation of the Charter where, due to a material change in the
circumstance or the discovery of new evidence, they are convinced that a measure that did
not constitute a justifiable limit on a Charter right at the time the judicial decision was issued
now constitutes a justifiable limit on a Charter right” (ibid at 34).
62. Morton, supra note 2 at 26.
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of the “Commonwealth model” were designed to protect coordinate interpretive
authority. Hence the sizeable space for coordinate dialogue toward the left-hand
portion of Figure 2. In not compartmentalizing court-centric dialogue into
the strong-form side of Figure 2, we capture Tushnet’s argument that judicial
interpretive supremacy may emerge in otherwise weak-form regimes. On the other
hand, the key feature of strong-form judicial reviewthat ordinary legislative
majorities cannot displace judicial interpretationsuggests notions of judicial
interpretive superiority or supremacy and thus tilts those systems in the direction
of court-centric dialogue. Here again, by not limiting coordinate dialogue to
the weak-form portion of Figure 2, we indicate that such dialogue can find a
placethough usually a more contentious (and thus smaller) placeeven in
systems of strong-form judicial review. Canada’s (now mostly) strong-form system
of judicial review effectively illustrates the relationships represented by Figure 2.

II. COURT-CENTRIC VERSUS COORDINATE DIALOGUE IN
(MOSTLY) STRONG-FORM CANADA
Figure 2 suggests that, while coordinate interpretation may survive in strong-form
systems of judicial review, court-centric dialogue will predominate. Certainly
Canada has tilted substantially in the direction of court-centric dialogue because
of its similar tilt toward strong-form judicial review. This is evident with respect
to the two major forms of dialogue identified by Hogg, Thornton, and Wright:
section 33 dialogue and reasonable limits dialogue.63 Nevertheless, coordinate
dialogue persists to some extent, especially in a variant of so-called second-look
cases that we will call “reconsideration” cases.
A. SECTION 33 DIALOGUE

Although the formally weak-form “notwithstanding” clause might be thought
to provide legislatures with the opportunity to engage in what coordinate
theorists consider “genuine”64 dialogue about the meaning of Charter provisions,
this coordinate perspective has essentially lost its battle with the court-centric
perspective on section 33 dialogue, according to which use of the notwithstanding
clause overrides the Charter as judicially interpreted. Indeed, this court-centric
perspective accounts for the widespread description of section 33 as the legislative

63. Hogg, Thornton & Wright, supra note 60.
64. Ibid at 31.
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“override.”65 Overriding the Charter is clearly not the same as engaging in legitimate
dialogue about its proper interpretation. Overriding the Charter is so politically
fraught, moreover, that most observers no longer consider section 33 an effective
dialogic response to judicial decisions.66 When the Supreme Court of Canada
struck down Canada’s ban on tobacco advertising in RJR-MacDonald by a narrow
five-four majority,67 long-time opponents of section 33, such as Ed Broadbent
(former leader of the federal New Democratic Party), became its enthusiastic
champions and urged that it be used to reverse the decision.68 However, the
stigma of overriding rights prevented the government from acting in this way.
The perception of the notwithstanding clause as contrary to the Charter has led
some academics69 to suggest it has been essentially written-out of the Charter
and its use inhibited by an emerging constitutional convention or through the
operation of the legal doctrine of desuetude.70 Even strictly procedural uses of
section 33 are seemingly off the table: During an oral hearing asking the Supreme
Court to extend a delayed declaration of invalidity, Justice Russell Brown shocked
some observers by noting that the Government could readily obtain a five-year

65. See Lorraine Weinrib, “Learning to Live with the Override” (1990) 35:3 McGill LJ 541;
Roach, Supreme Court of Trial, supra note 1 at 186; Peter H Russell, “The Notwithstanding
Clause: The Charter’s Homage to Parliamentary Democracy” (February 2007) Pol’y Options
65 at 66. Rainer Knopff has fallen prey to the ubiquitous “override” metaphor in his previous
writings. See e.g. Rainer Knopff and F L Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, ON:
Nelson, 1992) at 18, 29-30, 75, 78, 84, 137, 151, 161, 228, 229, 380, 383. That book does,
however, express reservations about this language at 179-80. Similarly, Dennis Baker uses the
override terminology but explicitly notes the problem this usage creates: Baker, Not Quite
Supreme, supra note 56 at 40.
66. Despite its technical availability, the notwithstanding clause has never been used by the
federal government and has been used only once by any governmentQuebecin direct
response to a Supreme Court decision, Ford v Quebec (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR
(4th) 577. This has led one scholar to argue that the clause is a “paper tiger”available
in theory but not used in practice; see Howard Leeson, “Section 33, the Notwithstanding
Clause: A Paper Tiger?” (2000) 6:4 IRPP Choices 1 at 14, 20.
67. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199, 127 DLR (4th) 1 [RJR-MacDonald].
68. Rainer Knopff & Andrew Banfield, “‘It’s the Charter Stupid’: The Charter and the Courts in
Federal Partisan Politics” in Joseph Magnet & Bernard Adell, eds, The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms at Twenty Five Years (Toronto: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009).
69. See e.g. Jamie Cameron, “The Charter’s Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the
Constitutional Imagination?” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, Grant Huscroft & Ian
Brodie, eds, (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2004).
70. Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude” (2014) 62 Am
J Comp Law 641.

626

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

extension by using the notwithstanding clause.71 In Canada, for all practical
purposes, the invocation of the clause transforms any narrow discussion of the
substance of any rights-limitation into a debate about the precariousness of rights
in general. Since no government wants to be seen as opposed to rights in general,
the mechanism is ill-suited to be a vehicle for dialogue in any particular case.
Tushnet’s thesis about how a weak-form institutional design can “escalate” into a
strong-form reality is exemplified by the fate of section 33.72
B. REASONABLE LIMITS DIALOGUE

Strong-form assumptions about Canadian judicial review have not only
contributed to the demise of section 33 as an avenue of coordinate dialogue,
they have also strengthened the court-centric perspective on the second widely
discussed dialogic opportunity under the Charter, namely “reasonable limits”
dialogue. Such dialogue arises especially under section 1 of the Charter.73 The
Supreme Court established the framework for applying section 1 in Oakes.74 To
qualify as a reasonable limit on Charter rights under the Oakes test, a law must have
a “pressing and substantial objective” and legislative means must be proportional
to that objective.75 Proportional means must be “rationally connected” to the
pressing and substantial objective in the sense of actually achieving it.76 Even
means that achieve the objective will fail the Oakes test unless their impairment
of Charter rights is plausibly minimal.77 Finally, the benefits of even a “minimal
impairment” of rights must outweigh the costs in lost rights.78
It is under the proportional means component of the Oakes test, and
especially under its minimal impairment standard, that most section 1 dialogue
occurs. In other words, a judgment striking down a law for exceeding minimal
impairment of a Charter right or freedom will often leave room for legislative

71. Todd MacCharles, “Ottawa surprises top court judges by allowing assisted suicide to
proceed in Quebec”, Toronto Star (11 January 2016), online: <www.thestar.com/news/
canada/2016/01/11/ottawa-surprises-top-court-judges-by-asking-for-more-time-onassisted-suicide.html>.
72. Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” supra note 6 at 824.
73. Charter, supra note 16, s 1.
74. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
75. Ibid at paras 69, 70.
76. Ibid at para 70.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid at para 71.
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fine tuning to achieve the same policy end with less rights impairment.79 In the
aforementioned case on tobacco advertising, for example, while the legislature
could no longer ban all commercial advertising because of the Charter’s guarantee
of freedom of expression, the majority’s ruling indicated that a ban limited to
“lifestyle advertising” would be a reasonable limit on that freedom.80
As in the case of section 33 dialogue, the dialogue about reasonable limits
generates debates between the court-centric and coordinate perspectives. From
the court-centric perspective, the dialogic room for legislative maneuver occurs
within the bounds of judicially established standards of section 1 minimal
impairment, or section 7 “fundamental justice,” or section 8 “reasonable search
and seizure,” etc. Thus, when the Canadian government responded to the
tobacco advertising ruling in RJR-MacDonald by enacting a more limited ban
on lifestyle advertising—essentially what the Court’s majority had suggested—
court-centric theorists considered this dialogue. We will call this “implementation
dialogue”—i.e. a legislative or governmental sequel that essentially implements
a specific suggestion by a court. For coordinate theorists, such implementation
dialogue is like asking a waiter for a sandwich and getting what one had ordered.81
In Grant Huscroft’s view, for example, Parliament’s response to RJR-MacDonald
“simply legislated in accordance with the parameters that the Court’s majority
decision allowed. The Court did not just influence the democratic process;
it dictated the content of constitutionally permissible legislation.”82 Agreeing
with Huscroft, Emmett Macfarlane does not treat the sequel to RJR-MacDonald
as genuine dialogue.83 True or “genuine”84 dialogue, from this coordinate

79. Similar dialogic fine-tuning sometimes occurs with respect not to section 1 but to a
“reasonableness” standard incorporated directly within a Charter right or freedom. Thus,
section 8 of the Charter allows searches and seizures but only reasonable ones; section 12
permits punishment but not if it is “cruel and unusual”; and section 7 permits infringements
of “life, liberty, and security of the person” but only in accordance with “the principles of
fundamental justice.” We leave to one side the vexed question whether, say, an unreasonable
search and seizure or a violation of “fundamental justice” can be a reasonable limit under
section 1 of the Charter. Charter, supra note 16.
80. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 67 at para 95; Charter, supra note 16, s 2(b).
81. Morton, supra note 2.
82. Grant Huscroft, “Rationalizing Judicial Power: The Mischief of Dialogue Theory” in James
B Kelly & Christopher P Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 60.
83. Emmett Macfarlane, “Dialogue or Compliance? Measuring Legislatures’ Policy Responses
to Court Rulings on Rights” (2013) 32:1 Int’l Poli Sci Rev 39 at 43 [Macfarlane, “Dialogue
or Compliance”].
84. Hogg, Thornton & Wright, supra note 60 at 31.
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perspective, would enable the legislature to disagree with the court’s interpretation
of what constitutes a reasonable limit on freedom of expression.
But, say Canadian theorists of court-centric dialogue, legislatures can reverse
judicial decisions by using section 33 to override the courts. We have already noted
the court-centric assumptions embodied in portraying section 33 as an override
of the Charter and the practical difficulties that ensue. At any rate, the coordinate
perspective insists there should be some dialogic opportunity for legislatures to
express their disagreement with the judicial interpretation of reasonable limits—
and to test the judiciary’s commitment to that interpretation—through legislative
sequels that do not immediately invoke section 33.85
In fact, Canadian governments sometimes act as though they can engage in
coordinate disagreement with the Supreme Court without immediately resorting
to the notwithstanding clause in a legislative sequel that rejects the Court’s ruling.
While some characterize these responses as “notwithstanding-by-stealth,”86 this
term implies an element of deception that unfairly describes a public statute.
We prefer the term “reconsideration dialogue,” which is one of the two forms of
“second-look dialogue” discussed in the next section.

III. SECOND-LOOK DIALOGUE
We borrow the name for this form of dialogue from the discussion of “second
look” cases by Hogg, Thornton, and Wright.87 They define second-look
cases in the Canadian context as those “where the Court reviews the validity
of legislation enacted to replace a law struck down in a previous Charter
decision.”88 Second-looks also occur to review the validity of legislative sequels
to Charter-based modification of judge-made common law. Second-looks at
legislative sequels to rights-based judgments occur in the United States as well,
of course. Judicial second-looks are not, however, limited to strong-form regimes
in which courts enjoy the invalidation mandate; they are also possible in such
weak-form systems as New Zealand and the United Kingdom when legislatures
choose to modify laws found to be inconsistent or incompatible with the relevant

85. Baker, Not Quite Supreme, supra note 56 at 116-17.
86. James B Kelly & Matthew Hennigar, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and the Minister
of Justice: Weak-Form Review Within a Constitutional Charter of Rights” (2012) 10:1
Int’l J Const L 35.
87. Hogg, Thornton & Wright, supra note 60 at 19-24.
88. Ibid at 19.
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rights document in a first-look case.89 In other words, the opportunity for a
second-look exists whenever the legislature enacts new legislation in response to a
judicial interpretation challenging the rights compatibility of an existing statute
or modifying judge-made common law to make it more rights compatible. The
second-look question is always whether the legislative sequel is consistent with
the first-look judicial interpretation—that is, whether the new law resolves the
rights issues identified in the first look case, or whether it still falls short of rights
compatibility. In most cases, the judiciary will apply the same level of scrutiny to
the legislative sequel as it did to the original law, but Rosalind Dixon argues that
legislative sequels are entitled to “ex post deference” in the second-look.90
While judicial second-looks cannot be prevented in the United States,
they can be in the other regimes under consideration. In New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, the legislature can simply ignore the finding or declaration
of incompatibility. In those circumstances there is no legislative sequel for
courts to assess in a second-look case, and the existing law remains in place and
fully applicable. In Canada, including a section 33 notwithstanding clause in a
legislative sequel similarly forecloses any second-look opportunity by the courts,
at least for the five-year duration of the clause.
Canadian sequels that lack a section 33 notwithstanding clause—i.e.,
virtually all legislative sequels—invite judicial second-looks in two main ways.
The first and most common kind of second-look invitation occurs when it is not
clear whether the legislative sequel falls within the policy leeway established by
the judicial first look. For example, the legislative sequel may come from an array
of alternatives that all involve less infringement of rights than the invalidated
policy but that arguably still violate those rights to varying degrees. The courts
do not treat the minimal impairment or “least restrictive means” standard of the
Oakes test as a literal absolute. That is, legislatures will be given some room for
maneuver and are not required to choose the truly least restrictive means.91 But
how much room for maneuver? Can the legislature choose the available policy
89. The UK Parliament generally modifies laws declared to be incompatible with the Human
Rights Act, thereby providing second-look opportunities; Gardbaum, supra note 42 at
174-76. Gardbaum reports, however, that at his time of writing there had “as yet been
no ‘second-look’ case in which a court has issued a declaration with respect to legislation
enacted to remedy a prior declaration,” although one case came close, and Parliament’s joint
committee on human right had rendered a negative opinion in a non-judicial second-look at
legislation purporting to remedy a declaration of incompatibility.
90. Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference” (2009)
47 Osgoode Hall LJ 235.
91. R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713 at para 183, 35 DLR (4th) 1.
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alternative that comes closest to the level of rights impairment represented by
the invalidated law? If not, how much further along the impairment continuum
must it go? Such questions arise when the judicial opinion is itself ambiguous
and open to interpretation. If the government tests the ambiguity in a judicial
ruling by choosing an option close to the invalidated one, it clearly invites a
subsequent challenge alleging that the government has continued to err on the
side of too much rights restriction. Such second-look invitations essentially invite
the courts to clarify and refine their earlier ruling. Accordingly, we shall call such
inter-institutional interaction “clarification dialogue.”
Motivated litigants will launch second-look cases even when they have little
prospect of success because the legislative sequel represents implementation
dialogue and thus poses few if any questions in need of clarification. Thus,
Canadian litigants mounted a second-look challenge to Parliament’s narrower
ban on the lifestyle advertising of tobacco even though this is precisely the
kind of policy the Court had suggested in RJR-Macdonald. Not surprisingly,
the Court turned aside the new challenge and confirmed the constitutionality
of the legislative sequel.92 In other cases, as we shall see, the scope for serious
clarification dialogue is much greater, and controversy arises about whether the
legislative sequel oversteps the bounds of legitimate policy maneuver left by the
first look decision. Whether that has occurred is the question for clarification in
a second-look case.
The second kind of second-look invitation occurs when a legislative sequel
openly disagrees with a prevailing judicial interpretation and clearly enacts
what had been declared unconstitutional. In such cases, the court, rather than
being asked to clarify its prior interpretation, is invited to reconsider and perhaps
reverse it. When this happens, we have the dramatic kind of “reconsideration
dialogue” mentioned abovei.e., legislation that clearly disagrees with the court
without using the section 33 notwithstanding clause. We consider each kind of
second-look dialogue in more detail below.
A. CLARIFICATION DIALOGUE

A telling example of clarification dialogue occurred with respect to the previously
mentioned Sauvé litigation concerning prisoner voting rights. As noted,
the Supreme Court decided in 2002 that no limits on prisoner voting could
be constitutionally justified. This was the second of two prisoner voting cases
92. Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp, 2007 SCC 30 at paras 114-15, [2007] 2
SCR 610 [JTI-MacDonald].
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involving the same litigant, Richard Sauvé. In Sauvé I93 the Court had struck
down a blanket disqualification of prisoner voting that disenfranchised anyone
who happened to be in jail on voting day, whether it was for murder or for inability
to pay a minor fine. By the time Sauvé’s first case reached the Supreme Court,
Parliament had already modified the law to disenfranchise only prisoners serving
a sentence of two or more years. Nonetheless, the Court refused to comment on
the new law since it had not been part of the proceedings in the lower courts. The
modified legislation—more a legislative prequel than a sequel in this instance—
clearly invited a judicial second-look to clarify its constitutionality. Richard
Sauvé launched the second-look litigation because his own sentence for murder
far exceeded the new two-year threshold for voting disqualification. Although he
had successfully challenged the blanket disqualification in his first case, he could
still not vote under its legislative replacement.
Sauvé I had struck down the blanket voting disqualification in a unanimous
but exceedingly brief decision (barely over a hundred words in total). The full
extent of the substantive judgment is found in a single sentence, which indicates
that the impugned law cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter as a
reasonable limit on the section 3 right to vote. Legislation imposing a blanket
disqualification, said Justice Iacobucci on behalf of the full Court, “is drawn
too broadly and fails to meet the proportionality test, particularly the minimal
impairment component of the test, as expressed in the section 1 jurisprudence
of the Court.”94 The clause emphasizing “the minimal impairment component”
of the Oakes test seems to suggest that at least some kind of carefully tailored
prisoner disqualification might be justified—if not the two-year sentencing
threshold chosen by Parliament, then perhaps the somewhat higher thresholds
used by some other countries (e.g., three or five years95) or even something
approaching the ten-year threshold advocated in 1991 by the Lortie Commission
on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.96 Or perhaps prisoner disqualifications
of any kind also contravene the rational connection component of section 1’s
proportionality test, meaning that they must be struck down for failing to achieve
the law’s “pressing and substantial” objective.97 The key sentence of the Court’s
Sauvé I opinion can be read both ways, and it is this ambiguity that was clarified
93.
94.
95.
96.

Sauvé v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 438, 15 CRR (2d) [Sauvé I].
Ibid.
Sauvé II, supra note 55 at para 131.
Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral
Democracy, vol 1 (Ottawa: Communication Group, 1991) [Lortie Commission]; Sauvé II,
supra note 55 at 164.
97. Oakes, supra note 74 at para 69.
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in the second-look of Sauvé II. In fact, the way in which the Court reached its
clarification highlighted the underlying ambiguity of its first-look judgment: The
four-judge minority in Sauvé II (including three judges who had participated
in Sauvé I) voted to uphold the two-year threshold as meeting the minimal
impairment standard, while the five-judge majority (including two judges who
had participated in Sauvé I) invalidated all possible prisoner disqualifications as
failing to meet the rational connection criterion.
A more recent legislative sequel that tests judicial interpretive ambiguity in
ways inviting a clarification second-look occurred with respect to the Supreme
Court’s 2011 decision in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services
Society.98 The case concerned Insite, Vancouver’s supervised safe injection site.
Opened in 2003, the facility offers drug users a place to inject their own drugs
(typically heroin and cocaine) under the supervision of clinical staff. The staff
provides clean needles for users, who also have access through Insite to other
(non-mandatory) services such as counseling and addiction treatment. Insite is
part of the “harm reduction” approach to drug addiction, which seeks to minimize
the harm associated with drug use rather than change the behaviour itself.
Under section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA),
the possession of narcotics is prohibited. However, in order to facilitate such
activities as medical research, section 56 of the CDSA permits the federal Minister
of Health to grant exemptions. In 2003, Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government
granted Insite an exemption for a three-year pilot project. In September 2006,
the Conservatives extended Insite’s exemption until the end of 2007 and later
by an additional six months, to mid-2008. Despite these extensions, it was
clear that the Conservative government did not want Insite to continue. “If
you remain a drug addict,” Prime Minister Harper said in 2007, “I don’t care
how much harm you reduce, you are going to have a short and miserable
life.”99 After its earlier extensions ran out, the Harper Government denied the
application for the exemption in 2008, over the objections of the municipal
and provincial governments, which strongly supported the clinic. The Court
ruled that the Minister’s denial was arbitrary (since it was inconsistent with the
legislative purpose of the exemption) and grossly disproportional (since Insite
was proven to save lives with no negative impact on public safety and public
health). In addition, the judgment paid homage to the “cooperative federalism”
98. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR
134 [PHS Community].
99. Gloria Galloway, “Harper Takes Aim at Drug Culture”, The Globe and Mail (5
October 2007) A4.
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that led to Insite’s creation, emphasizing the very broad consensus of state and
non-state actors working for its establishment.100 The Court ordered the Minister
of Health, Leona Aglukkaq, to reverse previous Minister Tony Clement’s decision
and grant Insite the exemption it sought.
While insisting on an exemption for Insite, the Court went out of its way
to indicate that its judgment was not “an invitation for anyone who so chooses
to open a facility for drug use under the banner of a ‘safe injection facility’.”101
The Minister, it said, should continue to “strike the appropriate balance between
achieving the public health and public safety goals.”102 In the case of the desperate
community of Downtown Eastside Vancouver, the balance clearly favoured
an exemption for Insite, but the “appropriate balance” might tilt against safe
injection sites in other circumstances.103
The key, for the Court, was that the Minister’s discretion in striking the
balance be guided by the consideration of appropriate and relevant criteria;
the decision should not be unconstrained and thus arbitrary. The Court listed
several factors the Minister should consider: “evidence, if any, on the impact of
such a facility on crime rates, the local conditions indicating a need for such a
supervised injection site, the regulatory structure in place to support the facility,
the resources available to support its maintenance, and expressions of community
support or opposition.”104
The Government’s legislative sequel to PHS took seriously (for some, much
too seriously) the Court’s requirement of guided, non-arbitrary discretion. Bill
C-2, the “Respect for Communities Act” (or, more properly, An Act to Amend
the Controlled Drug and Substances Act),105 required future applications for an
exemption to be accompanied by twenty-six supporting documents, including
letters of consent from various stakeholders (including the health officials from
the other two levels of government and the local police chief ), a report on the
“consultations held with a broad range of community groups,” a financing plan,
crime statistics, and an assurance than none of the key staff had a criminal record
for the past ten years.
This lengthy list of required documents could be read to fulfill the Court’s
requirement for guided discretion. Moreover, many of the documents seem
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

PHS Community, supra note 98 at para 19.
Ibid at para 140.
Ibid at para 152.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 153.
Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Controlled Drug and Substances Act, 2d Sess, 41st
Parl [Bill C-2].
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designed to ensure that the same kind of broad public and private consensus
that the Court found praiseworthy with respect to Insite exists for safe-injection
sites in other communities. That is not the only way to understand the new law,
however. For critics, the law amounted to a subversion of the Court’s decision.
After all, the Court had suggested that the Minister should generally grant the
exemption when “the evidence indicates that a supervised injection site will
decrease the risks of death and disease, and where there is little or no negative
impact on public safety.”106 Dr. Perry Kendall, the Provincial Health Officer of
British Columbia, and two other public health experts viewed the requirements
in Bill C-2 as “unnecessary and excessively onerous” and “oriented to building a
case for denying exemptions rather than approving them.”107 For them, the “law
[was] a thinly veiled attempt to end supervised injection services. Period.”108 The
Canadian Nurses Association viewed the legislation as essentially prohibitory
as well, with the requirements imposing “unnecessary and excessive barriers”
contrary to the “direction given by the Supreme Court.”109
Whether this legislative sequel fulfilled or violated the PHS judgment
presented an obvious opportunity for judicial clarification in a second-look case.
Had the Harper government remained in power, such a case would no doubt
have been launched by those who failed to secure an exemption for a new safe
injection site. That could still have occurred under the new Trudeau government
(elected in 2015) if it had treated the onerous process as an escape hatch from
the conflicting pressures of injection site enthusiasts and property owners irate at
the prospect of such a facility in their neighbourhood. The Trudeau government
was more inclined to grant exemptions, however, and in December 2017 it
introduced Bill C-37 to repeal Bill C-2’s criteria and replace them with five less
onerous requirements.110
The Harper Government’s legislative sequel to the Court’s 2013 Bedford111
decision on prostitution is likely also to trigger a clarifying judicial second-look
106. PHS Community, supra note 98 at para 152.
107. Perry Kendall, Patty Daly & John Carsley, “Vancouver’s Drug Users Need Compassion,
not Tories’ Contempt”, Globe and Mail (31 March 2015), online: < http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/opinion/vancouvers-drug-users-need-compassion-not-tories-contempt/
article23701851/>.
108. Ibid.
109. Canadian Press, “Safe injection site law ‘whips up’ Tory base, may block new facilities”, CBC
News (23 June 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/m/touch/politics/story/1.3123962>.
110. Peter Zimonjic & Matthew Kupfer, “Liberals to make safe injection sites easier to open and
fentanyl harder to smuggle into Canada” CBC News (12 December 2016), online: <www.
cbc.ca/news/politics/safe-injection-sites-goodale-philpott-1.3892687>.
111. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].
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(again unless the Trudeau government repeals or revises the law first). In Bedford,
the Court addressed Criminal Code provisions that outlawed activities associated
with the otherwise legal activity of prostitution. In the Court’s view, the provisions
against “bawdy-houses” and “living off the avails”112 (i.e., pimping) infringed
sex workers’ section 7 rights to “life, liberty, and security of the person” by
jeopardizing their safety.113 The prohibition of “living off the avails” meant they
could not hire protection, and the ban on “bawdy houses” prevented them from
working in safe, off-the-street environments. There was no justification, in the
Court’s view, for trying to deter a perfectly legal activity by making it unsafe.
But could Parliament criminalize prostitution itself? The Court explicitly
refused to address this question and declared early in its judgment that the case,
on its facts, was “not about whether prostitution should be legal or not.”114 In its
legislative sequel to Bedford, the Harper government exploited this unanswered
question by making prostitution explicitly illegal.
Following the so-called Nordic model for criminalizing prostitution, the
new Criminal Code provisions (sections 286.1 to 286.4), passed as Bill C-36115 by
the Harper government in 2014, target the buyers rather than the sellers involved
in prostitution. That is, instead of prosecuting sex workers themselves, for the
defensible reason that they constitute an already vulnerable population, the law
criminalizes the activity of the “johns” or customers. The obtaining (rather than the
provision) of sexual services is illegal regardless of where the activity takes place.116
Related sections criminalize procurement117 and prohibit advertisement of sexual
services.118 Section 286.2 specifically criminalizes prostitution for “financial or
other material benefit” but, by virtue of section 286.5, sex workers are immune
from prosecution if the benefit “is derived from their own sexual services” (they
are also immune from prosecution of the advertising offence if it is in relation to
their own sexual services). It is clear from the drafting of the Act that the activity
of prostitution is surely criminal, even if one party—presumed to be a vulnerable
person—is shielded from criminal consequences. This legislative sequel clearly
invites a second-look case to clarify the Court’s views on precisely the question it
112.
113.
114.
115.

Criminal Code, supra note 29, ss 197(1), 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c).
Charter, supra note 16, s 7.
Bedford, supra note 111 at para 2.
Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Attorney General of Canada v Bedford and to make consequential amendments to
other Acts, 2d Sess, 41st Parl, c 25 [Bill C-36].
116. Criminal Code, supra note 29, s 286.1.
117. Ibid, s 286.3.
118. Ibid, s 286.4.
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left open in Bedford: whether, constitutionally speaking, “prostitution should be
legal or not.”119
B. RECONSIDERATION DIALOGUE

Reconsideration dialogue occurs when, in contrast to the forgoing sequences,
there is no plausible room within a controlling judicial opinion for Parliament’s
legislative response to that opinion. This was certainly true of the legislative sequel
to Daviault.120 Daviault is an example of how the development of judge-made
common law—as opposed to statutory interpretation or invalidation—can
generate inter-institutional dialogue under an entrenched rights document.
In Daviault, the Supreme Court used its interpretive mandate to change a
common-law rule prohibiting drunkenness as a permissible defence to the
charge of sexual assault. The majority maintained that both the principles of
fundamental justice enshrined in section 7 of the Charter and the presumption of
innocence in section 11(d) required that a defence of extreme drunkenness—so
extreme that it created a state of automatism—be available to someone accused
of sexual assault.121 A three-judge minority dissented. Parliament generally has
the power to alter and even reverse judge-made common law, but in this case
the common-law modification was explicitly based on constitutional provisions,
thus raising the same dialogic question that is posed by the invalidation of a
statute: how much room for maneuver did the ruling leave for a legislative
sequel? As Roach observes, a dialogic response that worked within the parameters
established by the Daviault majority’s opinion was arguably open to Parliament.
The majority’s opinion “invited” Parliament to create the new crime of “causing
harm while extremely intoxicated,”122 which would cover Daviault’s situation
without charging him with an offence for which he could not have formed the
requisite intent. Instead of exploiting the opening plausibly left by the majority’s
constitutional interpretation, Parliament, responding to public outrage, legislated
the pre-Daviault status quo and sided with the Daviault dissent, thereby
“suggesting that the majority … was wrong to interpret the Charter as it did.”123
Clearly, this legislative sequel posed no issues of clarification in a second-look
case. In effect, the legislature had challenged the Court to reconsider and reverse
its original judgment.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Bedford, supra note 111 at para 2.
R v Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63, [1994] SCJ No 77 [Daviault].
Charter, supra note 16, ss 7, 11(d).
Roach, Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 275.
Ibid at 276.
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Reconsideration dialogue must be distinguished not only from clarification
dialogue but also from what happens when a government appeals a lower
court decision. In appealing, the government certainly disagrees with a judicial
interpretation and asks for that interpretation to be reconsidered. For this reason,
some scholars claim that appeals constitute another form of dialogue.124 However,
by appealing, the government merely asks another higher court to reconsider the
interpretation of a lower court rather than expressing interpretive disagreement
through new legislation based on an alternative interpretation. Indeed, such
legislation is unnecessary until the appeal process has been exhausted and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation remains unpalatable to the government. If the
government then accepts the ruling, it bows to judicial interpretive supremacy
and thus to the premise of court-centric dialogue. It is only when new legislation
clearly challenges the Supreme Court to reconsider its initial interpretation that
we have true reconsideration dialogue.
While only a Supreme Court ruling can trigger reconsideration dialogue,
rulings at any level of court can lead to clarification dialogue. We have already noted
that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sauvé I launched a round of clarification
dialogue. But, of course, legislatures do not have to wait for a Supreme Court
ruling before enacting legislation that tests the interpretive ambiguity of judicial
decisions. They can enact such legislation in response to lower court rulings as
well. If it loses a subsequent round of lower court clarification, the legislature
might try again or appeal. If it loses at a level of intermediate appeal, it might make
another legislative attempt without seeking or getting a Supreme Court ruling.125
Even if the new legislation reaches the Supreme Court, enough interpretive
ambiguity might remain to permit another round of clarification dialogue.
Only when the legislature directly and clearly disagrees with a Supreme
Court interpretation without using the section 33 notwithstanding clause,

124. Matthew E Hennigar, “Expanding the ‘Dialogue’ Debate: Canadian Federal Government
Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions” (2004) 37:1 Can J Poli Sci 3.
125. Such iterative clarification dialogue at lower court levels occurred for years with respect
to the question of medicinal marijuana. See R v Parker (2000), 49 OR (3d) 481, 188
DLR (4th) 385 (ONCA); Hitzig v Canada (2003), 231 DLR (4th) 104, 14 CR (6th) 1
(ONCA); R v Long (2007), 88 OR (3d) 146, 226 CCC (3d) 66 (ONCJ); Sfetkopoulos
v Canada (Attorney General), [2008] 3 FCR 399, 78 Admin LR (4th) 171 (FC);
R v Mernagh, 2013 ONCA 67, [2013] OJ No 440 (QL) [Mernagh]. Paragraphs 2 through
7 of Mernagh describe the iterative legislative tailoring undertaken in response to judicial
invalidations on section 1 grounds. Note that a legislative response might not be subject to a
Supreme Court ruling if the Court does not grant leave to appeal.
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as Parliament did in response to Daviault, does clarification dialogue give way to
reconsideration dialogue.
And only Daviault-style reconsideration dialogue qualifies unambiguously
as coordinate dialogue. Such dialogue, Roach notes, depends on the theory of
“coordinate construction” because it assumes “that Parliament is entitled to act on
its own interpretation of the constitution, even when it is at odds with that of the
Court”126—an entitlement coordinate theorists would defend. Moreover, Roach
underlines the legislature’s assumption that it can engage in such coordinate
dialogue without resorting to the section 33 notwithstanding clause. In Roach’s
view, “the inevitable Charter challenge” to Parliament’s “in your face” response to
Daviault will give the Court an opportunity “to clarify what sort of dialogue from
Parliament [it] is willing to accept without the use of the override.”127
Parliament engaged in a similar round of coordinate reconsideration dialogue
with the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in O’Connor,128 another instance
of common-law development. The case concerned how much access defendants
in sexual assault cases should have to the complainant’s counseling records.
Members of the Supreme Court divided sharply (five to four) on this question,
with the majority insisting on more liberal access than the dissenters considered
appropriate. Here again Parliament provided the Court with a reconsideration
opportunity by essentially enacting the dissenting judgment.129 In accepting
the minority judgment, the legislative sequel could be seen as still deferring to
judicial authority, but Parliament was certainly rejecting what it considered a
mistaken-but-controlling majority judgment and thereby inviting the Court to
reconsider. There was no room within the controlling judgment for Parliament’s
response. Critics of the O’Connor sequel, moreover, displayed court-centric views
when they called it another “in your face” response, undertaken without recourse
to section 33.130
Parliament’s legislative sequel to R v Morales131 provided the Court with a
third reconsideration opportunity. Maximo Morales had challenged a Criminal
Code provision allowing judges to deny bail when it was “necessary in the public
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Roach, Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 276.
Ibid.
R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411, 130 DLR (4th) 235 [O’Connor].
Bill C-36, supra note 115.
Roach, Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 278, 287-88; Jamie Cameron argues that the
response to Mills should have been “channeled through s.33’s mechanism for overriding the
Charter.” Jamie Cameron, “Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment
on R. v. Mills,” 31 Alta L Rev (2000) 1051 at 1057 [Cameron, “Dialogue and Hierarchy”].
131. R v Morales [1992] 3 SCR 711, 17 CR (4th) 74 [Morales].
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interest or for the protection or safety of the public.”132 The Court’s majority
invalidated this provision for infringing the Charter’s section 11(e) right “not
to be denied reasonable bail without just cause.”133 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Lamer found the “public interest” criterion to be unconstitutionally
vague. Bail could be reasonably denied in only two circumstances, argued Lamer:
(1) to ensure the accused would appear for trial, and (2) to prevent the accused
from committing another serious offence. Under the “standardless sweep” of
the public interest provision, by contrast, a court could “order imprisonment
whenever it sees fit.”134
Parliament’s legislative response to Morales included a clause allowing bail to
be denied “in order to maintain the confidence in the administration of justice.”135
As several commentators have noted, this new “confidence” provision is arguably
just as vague (or “standardless”) as the public interest wording it replaced.136 It
was certainly intended to extend beyond Lamer’s two bail-denying circumstances,
which were explicitly covered by other clauses in Parliament’s legislative sequel.137
Insofar as it had enacted, without a section 33 notwithstanding clause, what
had previously been judicially invalidated, Parliament had extended another
reconsideration invitation to the Court.
Although the much anticipated reconsideration challenge to Parliament’s
Daviault sequel has yet to materialize before the Supreme Court,138 challenges to
132.
133.
134.
135.

Criminal Code, supra note 29, s 515(10)(b).
Charter, supra note 16, s 11(e).
Morales, supra note 131 at 732.
The new legislation, s 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, as amended in 1997,
would have allowed the denial of bail for any “just cause being shown” (using the wording of
the Charter itself ) and “without limiting the generality of the foregoing, where the detention
is necessary in order to maintain the confidence in the administration of justice, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the
gravity of the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the
potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.” Criminal Code, supra note 29, s 515(10)(c).
136. Stephen G Coughlan, “Half-Full Glasses, Pendulums and Individual Rights: The First
Twenty Years of the Charter” (2003) 53 UNBLJ 299 at 310; Baker, Not Quite Supreme, supra
note 56 at 31-33.
137. Criminal Code, supra note 29, s 515(10)(a) (“where the detention is necessary to ensure
attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law”) and (b) (“where the
detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public … including any substantial
likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or
interference with the administration of justice”).
138. Dennis Baker & Rainer Knopff, “Daviault Dialogue: The Strange Journey of
Canada’s Intoxication Defence” (2014) 19:1 Rev Const Stud 35 [Baker & Knopff,
“Daviault Dialogue”].
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its O’Connor and Morales sequels came more quickly. In Mills, the Court essentially
accepted the legislative response to O’Connor, calling it legitimate “dialogue.”139
In Hall, the Court upheld the Morales sequel denying bail “in order to maintain
the confidence in the administration of justice.”140 Hall, a suspected murderer,
was denied bail because of the “highly charged aftermath of the murder” even
though the bail judge had no worries that Hall would appear for trial or commit
a further offence (the two kinds of bail denial that Lamer’s Morales judgment
would allow). A sharply divided Court upheld the additional criterion,141 with the
four-judge minority declaring that the majority had “transformed dialogue into
abdication.”142 We might more generously suggest that the statutory amendment,
even absent a section 33 invocation, simply provided the occasion for the Court
to reconsider the constitutional interpretation it had made in Morales.
Together, Mills and Hall stand for the legitimacy of coordinate legislative
disagreement with the Court’s constitutional interpretations without immediate
resort to section 33. We emphasize the term “immediate” because the Court
can, if it so chooses, always force governments to use section 33. Had the Court
in Mills or Hall wanted to stick by its earlier precedents, it could have done so
by striking down the new legislation. The Court could conceivably do the same
thing if and when a clear constitutional challenge of the legislative sequel to
Daviault ever reaches it.143 Moreover, in areas where the judiciary is part of the
legal enforcement regime, as it clearly is in the criminal justice area, it can back
up its invalidation of a law by refusing to apply it. In such circumstances, the
legislature could ultimately prevail only by resorting to section 33.
Keeping the judiciary’s strong-form trump in mind, legislation that disagrees
with judicial interpretations without using section 33 is really a dialogic test of
the Court’s commitment to its initial determination of the issue at hand. Such
tests seem especially sensible where the Court was significantly divided on the
139. R v Mills [1999] 3 SCR 668, 180 DLR (4th) 1 [Mills].
140. R v Hall [2002] 3 SCR 309, 217 DLR (4th) 536 [Hall].
141. While the Court upheld the “necessary in order to maintain the confidence in the
administration of justice” language, it invalidated the other elements of s 515(10)(c ),
including the constitutional language of “just cause”; Ibid. An analysis of the Court’s
reasoning can be found by Dennis Baker, who argues that the surviving portion of
the section achieved the “primary aim” of legislators and “succeeded in modifying a
constitutional ruling of the Court.” Baker, Not Quite Supreme, supra note 56 at 35.
142. Hall, supra note 140 at para 127.
143. Baker & Knopff explain why explicit constitutional second-looks have thus far stalled in
the lower courts, but argue that the Supreme Court has taken “a strategically camouflaged”
second-look in a statutory-interpretation case; “Daviault Dialogue,” supra note 138 at 48. See
also R v Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58, [2011] 3 SCR 575.
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interpretive issue.144 From the coordinate perspective, in other words, legislative
disagreements that do not use section 33 are a respectable intermediate stage of
dialogue, asking no more than the Court reconsider. Proponents of court-centric
dialogue disagree, often arguing that the legislature should have the courage of
its convictions by explicitly overriding the Court.145 A plausible coordinate reply
is that, facing a reconsideration test, the Court can express the courage of its
convictions and invalidate the new legislation. From the coordinate perspective,
if the convictions of the (often divided) Court do not withstand the second-look
test, this is a perfectly legitimate consequence of the “reasonable disagreement”
that tends to characterize constitutional controversies. Given that the legislative
sequel is a current expression of democratic preferences with the right consciously
in mind (something that could not be guaranteed with respect to the original
invalidated statute), it may sometimes be advisable in the context of a reasonable
disagreement for the Court to exercise the ex post deference that Dixon suggests—
but that is, at this stage of the dialogue, ultimately a question for the Court.
The claim by Hogg, Thornton, and Wright that coordinate dialogue “cannot
exist” in Canada because legislatures do not share interpretive authority with
the courts is mistaken.146 Constitutional supremacy need not mean judicial
interpretive supremacy; in fact, the text of the Canadian Constitution is
“silent on the issue of which institution is charged with the interpretation of
its provisions.”147 We have seen legislatures express their disagreement with the
Supreme Court through ordinary legislation, unprotected by section 33. And we
have seen the Court change its mind and accept the new legislation, as in Mills
and Hall. Hogg, Thornton, and Wright’s position is stronger if it is read as a claim
about general trends. The court-centric view they defend is certainly predominant
in Canadian constitutional discourse,148 and Mills and Hall remain the only (and
much criticized) instances in which the Court has clearly acquiesced in coordinate
legislative responses. This is why the area of coordinate dialogue in Figure 2
narrows substantially as it moves into the region of strong-form judicial review.
That it is not completely foreclosed, however, remains significant. Strong-form
systems tilt toward court-centric dialogue but do not require it.
144. Baker & Knopff, “Minority Retort,” supra note 57.
145. Roach Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 276-78; Cameron, “Dialogue and Hierarchy,”
supra note 130 at 1062-63; Hogg, Thornton & Wright, “Dialogue Revisited,” supra note 60
at 40 (“the legislature could have had the last word if the political will to restore the old law
had been stronger”).
146. Hogg, Thornton & Wright, supra note 60 at 31.
147. Baker, Not Quite Supreme, supra note 56 at 39.
148. Ibid at 39-52.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The international debate about dialogue theory is conducted partly in terms of
the distinction between dialogue that assumes judicial interpretive supremacy
(court-centric dialogue) and dialogue based on a legitimate interpretive role for
the other branches of government (coordinate dialogue). In strong-form systems
of judicial review, court-centric dialogue tends to predominate, though coordinate
dialogue emerges from time to time.149 Similarly, strong-form assumptions and
practices can emerge within a weak-form institutional design.
From the coordinate-dialogue perspective, the court-centric version is
frequently described as a monologue in which the courts speak and the political
branches follow orders, much as a waiter delivers an ordered sandwich. To the
friends of coordinate interpretation, such implementation of judicial instructions
cannot be considered dialogue in any genuine sense. But dialogue between courts
and the other branches of government comes in many shapes and sizes, and the
category of court-centric dialogue is not exhausted by the simple implementation
of judicial instructions. Often it remains unclear precisely what those instructions
require. For example, when the Supreme Court in Bedford explicitly left open the
question of whether prostitution could be directly criminalized, did that mean
Parliament could constitutionally enact the Nordic model of criminalization,
or was that contrary to the spirit of the Bedford ruling? In such situations, the
second-look dialogue prompted by a legislative sequel is better described in terms
of clarification than implementation. The line between these two versions of
court-centric dialogue may not always be bright (even apparently clear judicial
instructions often leave at least some room for interpretation); still, it represents
a meaningful and useful distinction. Although we have emphasized Canadian
examples of clarification dialogue, legislative sequels to findings or declarations
of incompatibility (or to rights-based common-law development) may offer
clarification opportunities to courts in the weaker-form contexts of the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Australian sub-national jurisdictions with
statutory bills of rights. The concept of clarification dialogue, in other words,
provides an interesting avenue for further research in weak-form contexts.
Clarification dialogue remains court-centric because the non-judicial
participants in such interaction exploit the ambiguities, or unanswered questions,
within judicial interpretations rather than expressing open disagreement with
149. In one empirical account, only 17.4 percent of SCC invalidations from 1982 to 2009
began a “genuine dialogue” (a standard that is broader than our reconsideration dialogue).
Macfarlane, “Dialogue or Compliance,” supra note 83 at 47.
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those interpretations. Willingness to engage in open interpretive disagreement
is the hallmark of coordinate dialogue. Although interpretive disagreement
is a necessary feature of coordinate dialogue, it is not sufficient. Government
can express interpretive disagreement with a particular court by appealing to a
higher one. This form of dialogue remains court-centric inasmuch as it does
not challenge the interpretive supremacy of the judicial hierarchy as a whole.
Only when the more political branches of government clearly reject a high-court
judicial interpretation do we arrive at true coordinate dialogue.
In weak-form systems without an invalidation mandate, coordinate
disagreement with a high-court decision takes two main forms. First, if the court
has relied on its interpretive mandate to undertake rights-based modifications of
common law or an impugned statute, legislatures can enact a new statute clearly
implementing a policy option rejected by the court. Perhaps such legislation
could induce the court’s reconsideration in a second-look case, but it is also
possible that the court would now find the statute incompatible with its first-look
understanding of protected rights. Second, governments and legislatures can
express coordinate disagreement by ignoring an incompatibility finding or
declaration (whether issued in a first-look or second-look case). This leaves the
challenged statute fully in place. A rich classification of possible interactions exists
to illuminate analysis of coordinate dialogue in such weak-form jurisdictions as
New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
In stronger-form Canada, legislatures can also enact statutes expressing
coordinate disagreement with Charter-based statutory interpretation or
common-law development. They cannot, however, express coordinate
disagreement by ignoring the judicial invalidation of legislation; only a contrary
statute will suffice. Whether Canadian legislation disagrees with common-law
development, statutory interpretation, or the invalidation of a statute, the issue
that divides the court-centric and coordinate perspectives is whether a section 33
notwithstanding clause must be included in the first statutory attempt to register
disagreement. Coordinate theorists might be tempted to answer this question
in the affirmative were it not for the fact that the notwithstanding clause is so
strongly understood as overriding Charter rights. To disagree about the proper
interpretation of a right is quite different from overriding that right. It is precisely
because of the dominance of the override metaphor in Canada that section 33 has
declined as a realistic option for expressing interpretive disagreement in Canada.
This decline, moreover, reflects Canada’s “escalation”150 into a strong-form system
of judicial review.
150. Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” supra note 6 at 824.
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And yet, Canadian legislatures sometimes express clear disagreement with
a judicial interpretation through legislation that does not include a section
33 notwithstanding clause. In such cases—derided by proponents of judicial
interpretive supremacy as “in your face”151 challenges to judicial authority that
should include a section 33 override—the legislature essentially invites the
Court to reconsider and modify its original interpretation, as Parliament did
in its legislative responses to Daviault, O’Connor, and Morales. It is important
to note that the outcome of the Court’s reconsideration in such cases may well
reconfirm the original interpretation and holding, in which case the new law
would be struck down and the legislature could re-establish its preference only
through a section 33 notwithstanding clause. If we are right about the immense
and growing difficulty of using that clause, the Court ultimately retains the upper
hand in the institutional dialogue. The real issue between the court-centric and
coordinate perspectives in the Canadian context concerns the legitimacy of an
intermediate reconsideration phase in some second-look cases. Time will tell
whether this coordinate-interpretation vestige of weak-form design survives
Canada’s escalation toward a court-centric system of strong-form judicial review.

151. Roach, Supreme Court on Trial, supra note 1 at 276.

